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SASKATCHEWAN
LAW REVIEW
"Labour is Not a Commodity"l: The
Supreme Court of Canada and the
Freedom of Association
Judy Fudge*
This article charts the shift in the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' guarantee of freedom of association in the
context of claims by trade unions for protection of their collective bargaining rights.
It places this shift in Canadian Charter jurisprudence in the broader context of
neo-liberal politics and globalization, and it considers the extent to which the
Supreme Court, along with the International Labour Organization, can be
understood as responding to the challenge to develop new norms of governance.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, 1 surveyed how working people and unions in Canada had
fared before the courts when they invoked the freedom of association
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 in order
to protect their rights to bargain collectively and to strike.3 The
Supreme Court of Canada had just released three decisions in which
the majority of the judges clearly held that the freedom of association
Law Foundation of Saskatchewan Chair, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan
and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This article is a revised version of my Law
Foundation of Saskatchewan Lecture delivered at the College of Law, University of
Saskatchewan on February 24, 2004. I would like to thank Jacob Watters for his
very able research assistance and Beth Bilson and Ken Norman for their helpful
conversations on this topic.
1 One important justification for permitting worker collective action derives from
the recognition that labour is not merely a commodity or not a commodity at all,
as the International Labour Organization (ILO) famously declared in 1944: ILO,
26th Sess., Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour
Organization, (1944), being Annex l(a) to the ILO Constitution [1944 Declaration of
Philadelphia]. Reprinted in Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents in International Law,
5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 53-54; see also ILO, Constitution,
online: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm>.
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
3 Judy Fudge, "Labour, The New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" (1988) 13:2
Queen's L.J. 61.
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did not protect these rights. 4 I called the article "Labour, the New
Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" because the majority decisions
in the Labour Trilogy, as the three cases came to be known, exemplified
the narrow individualism and negative conception of freedom
embedded in the common law. Having just completed research on
the development of labour legislation in Canada during the first half
of the twentieth century, I was not surprised that a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court of Canada characterized workers'
collective bargaining rights as modern and legislative and not
fundamental. 5 The history of the courts' and common law's treatment
of collective action by workers is very clear. The courts protected the
common law contract and property rights of individuals, typically
employers, at the expense of workers who collectively organized, and
legislation was needed to protect workers' collective rights.6 Knowing
this, I concluded my assessment of the Labour Trilogy with the
grandiose claim that "while it is true that none of these decisions are
logically compelled, once placed in the context of the historic role of
the courts they were inevitable." 7
For over a decade my claim about the historical inevitability of
the highest courts' rejection of collective labour rights seemed to be
correct. There were a couple of decisions in 1999 in which the Supreme
Court decided that consumer leafleting during a labour dispute was
more like advertising than picketing and thus was deserving of
constitutional protection, 8 but until then, each time unions went to
the Court for protection of their collective rights, they lost. 9 In 2000
4 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [19871 1 S.C.R. 313, 38
D.L.R. (4th) 161 [Alberta Reference cited to S.C.R.]; PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
424, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 249 [PSAC cited to S.C.R.]; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 460, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 277 [RWDSU].
5 Judy Fudge, Voluntarism and Compulsion: The Canadian Federal Government's
Intervention in Collective Bargaining from 1900 to 1946 (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford
University, 1988) [unpublished].
6 See generally Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of
Workers Collective Action, 1900-48 (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2001).
7 Fudge, supra note 3 at 111.
8 U.F.C.W, Local 1518 v. Kmart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083, 176 D.L.R. (4th)
607 [cited to S.C.R.]. Although he stated that consumer leafleting during a labour
dispute was protected under the Charter's guarantee of freedom of expression, Cory
J. made it very clear that "consumer leafleting is very different from a picket line":
ibid. at 1113. Allsco Building Products Ltd. v. U.EC.W., Local 1288P, [1999] 2 S.C.R.
1136, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 647.
9 For a summary and discussion of all of these cases see Judy Fudge, "Lessons from
Canada: The Impact of the Charter and Freedoms in Labour and Employment
Law" in Keith Ewing, ed., Human Rights at Work (London: Institute for
Employment Rights, 2000) 175-201.
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I reviewed all of the Supreme Court of Canada decisions concerning
workers' rights and the Charter and I concluded that:
After 18 years with the Charter, the early optimism has almost
completely cooled, the most pessimistic predictions have
been tempered and the flood of labour-related litigation
has diminished to a trickle. With but minor, and very
recent, exceptions, unions have not been able to establish
collective labour rights under the Charter. The gap between
the strong endorsement by the International Labour
Organisation of workers' collective rights and their absence
from the Canadian rights jurisprudence is glaring. But,
neither have employers and individual employees been
able to deploy Charter rights to unravel the key components
of the statutory collective bargaining regime. The upshot is
that, despite years of litigation and millions of dollars in
legal fees, the central elements of the collective bargaining
regime have been preserved .... Self-styled pragmatists have
applauded the courts' deference to the political compromises
that legislatures and expert tribunals have fashioned in the
contested arena of labour relations. However, in a context in
which public sector workers' rights in particular and organised
labour's strength in general have been systematically
undermined, judicial deference has not been benign. Thus,
while the instrumental impact of the Charter on workers'
interests in employment and labour law has been slightly
positive at best or neutral at worst, its ideological impact
has been negative.10
In my view, the Supreme Court of Canada's emphasis on individualism
and negative freedoms in the context of repeated attempts by unions
to obtain constitutional protection for workers' rights reinforced the
tendency in neo-liberal politics to treat unions as coercive monopolies
rather than democratic organizations and to treat workers' rights as
special interests rather than fundamental human rights. 1 1 The
Supreme Court of Canada's decisions meant that governments were
entitled to run roughshod over workers' collective bargaining rights
if they had the political will to do so. As governments across Canada
10 Ibid. at 176-77 [footnotes omitted].
11 For a discussion of the neo-liberal turn in Canadian politics, which was taken by
Brian Mulroney's Conservative federal government in 1984 after Pierre Trudeau's
Liberal government paved the way for monetarism by imposing wage controls on
federal public sector workers, and the impact of this shift on labour legislation and
labour policy, see Leo Panitch & Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The
Assault on Trade Union Freedoms, 3rd ed. (Aurora, Ont.: Garamond Press, 2003).
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took a neo-liberal turn, collective bargaining rights were rolled
back. 12 This occurred first in Alberta, then in Ontario, and finally in
British Columbia and Quebec. Unlike freedom of expression, which
the Supreme Court of Canada had so broadly defined that it includes
everything from hate speech through pornography to tobacco
advertising, freedom of association was given a very narrow meaning,
and in the labour context included nothing more than the right to
join a trade union. 13
Who could have predicted that in 2001 eight members of the
Supreme Court of Canada would decide that there is a collective
dimension to the freedom of association; that the freedom to join a
trade union and participate in some of its activities are fundamental;
and that governments are under a positive obligation to protect
vulnerable workers from employer retaliation when they exercise
their Charter-protected rights? 14 In his majority judgment in Dunmore
v. Ontario (Attorney General), Bastarache J. stated that "the law must
recognize that certain union activities-making collective representations
to an employer, adopting a majority political platform, federating
with other unions-may be central to freedom of association even
though they are inconceivable on the individual level." 1 5
It is important not to exaggerate the "revolutionary potential" of
Dunmore as it contains real limitations. 16 Most significantly, although
12 Ibid. See also Mark Thompson, Joseph B. Rose & Anthony E. Smith, eds., Beyond
the National Divide: Regional Dimensions of Industrial Relations (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2003); Yonatan Reshef & Sandra Rastin, Unions in the
Time of Revolution: Government Restructuring in Alberta and Ontario (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2003). The election of the Liberal government of
Gordon Campbell in British Columbia in 2001 and the Liberal government of Jean
Charest in Quebec in 2002 resulted in changes to the private sector labour relations
legislation in both provinces and roll-backs to the collective agreements in the
broader and public sector: Rh6al S6guin "'We Promise 2004 will be an Exciting
Year' (No Kidding)" The Globe and Mail (20 December 2003) F2; Konrad Yakabuski
"Quebec Winter Going to be Steamy" The Globe and Mail (24 October 2003) B2.
13 For a discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions on the freedom of
expression, see Judy Fudge, "Legally Speaking: Courts, Democracy and the
Market" (2003) 19 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 111. Patricia Hughes remarked that "[tihe
narrow scope accorded freedom of association.. has always seemed discordant
with the interpretation given freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter":
Patricia Hughes, "Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General): Waiting for the Other
Shoe" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 27 at 40.
14 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, 207 D.L.R. (4th) 193,
2001 SCC 94 [Dunmore].
15 Ibid. at para. 17.
16 For example, Roy J. Adams exaggerates the "revolutionary potential" of the decision
by failing to discuss the limitations in the majority decision: Roy J. Adams, "The
Revolutionary Potential of Dunmore" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 117. The majority took
care both to limit the obligation on the government to provide statutory protection
to the vulnerable and to distinguish between making representations to an
employer from collective bargaining, see text accompanying note 61. In a recent
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Bastarache J. said that freedom of association has a collective
dimension, he also was very clear that it still does not include
collective bargaining and the right to strike. 17 There are also very
obvious ways in which courts can limit its scope to vulnerable
workers. 18 However, Dunmore does mark a change in the "discourse"
of the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the Charter in the
context of labour rights. 19 Dissent has been elevated to dicta,2 0 unions
are no longer analogized to gun clubs, and collective bargaining and
strikes are no longer compared to golf.2 1 Despite its limitations,
Dunmore suggests that my claim in 1987 that the Supreme Court of
Canada would continue to be hostile to collective labour rights and
to impose positive obligations on governments to protect these rights
was wrong. But only the cases that follow Dunmore will tell by how
much I was wrong.
This article explores the shift in the Supreme Court of Canada's
reasoning regarding freedom of association and collective labour
rights and tries to determine why this shift has occurred. Instead of
addressing the normative question of what the Supreme Court of
volume of the Canadian Labour & Employment Law Journal that devoted a special
section to articles on labour law and the Charter, union-side lawyers tended to
emphasize the expanded scope of union protection after Dunmore: Steven M.
Barrett, "Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General): Freedom of Association at the
Crossroads" (2003) 10 C.L.E.LJ. 83; and Chris Rootham et al., "The Expanded
Scope of Union Protection under the Charter" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 161. Employer-
side lawyers tended to emphasize its limitations: see John Craig & Henry Dinsdale,
"A 'New Trilogy' or the Same Old Story?" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 59; and Brian W.
Burkett, John D.R. Craig & Jodi Gallagher, "Canada and the ILO: Freedom of
Association since 1982" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 231.
17 Dunmore, supra note 14 at para. 17.
18 Ibid. at paras. 41, 45.
19 Ken Norman, "Freedom of Association" in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes, eds., The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell) c. 7 [forthcoming
in 2004].
20 Hughes, supra note 13 at 38, notes that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in
Dunmore.. .raises dicta and dissents in its previous labour relations jurisprudence to
the level of ratio, both with respect to the meaning of freedom of association and
the obligation of government to take positive action in aid of fundamental
freedoms."
21 In the Alberta Reference, supra note 4 at 404, Mclntryre J. stated that the
"unacceptability" of according independent constitutional status to the aims,
purposes, and activities of an association was clearly demonstrated by Peter A.
Gall's example of a gun club in Peter A. Gall, "Freedom of Association and Trade
Unions: A Double-edged Constitutional Sword" in Joseph M. Weiler & Robin M.
Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 247. McIntyre J. also analogized the right to
strike to the right to golf, supra note 4 at 408. For a criticism of this analogy, see
H.W. Arthurs, "'The Right to Golf': Reflections on the Future of Workers, Unions
and the Rest of Us under the Charter" (1988) 13 Queen's L.J. 17.
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Canada should do,2 2 I shall look at what the Court has done and
speculate about why it may have shifted direction. The first section
describes and critically evaluates the shift in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence about the freedom of association and trade unions and
collective bargaining and discusses some of the implications of this
shift. The second section briefly considers what this shift indicates
about broader institutional and political changes in Canada and
internationally. Dunmore suggests that my initial assessment of the
role of the courts and labour's collective rights did not appreciate the
complex relationship between courts and governments on the one
hand, and liberal principles and globalization on the other.
II. FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
In the early 1980s when governments across Canada imposed wage
controls on public sector workers, unions invoked the Charter's
guarantee of freedom of association to challenge legislative restrictions
on their rights to bargain collectively and to strike.2 3 Unions argued
that the Charter's guarantee of freedom of association ought to be
read purposively and, as such, should include not only the right to
join an association to pursue common goals, but also to protect the
objects of the association (in their case, collective bargaining) and the
means by which those objects are pursued (in their case, striking).
This argument was spectacularly unsuccessful before the Supreme Court.
In the Alberta Reference several public sector unions challenged a
bundle of Alberta statutes that placed restrictions on collective
bargaining by provincial government employees, firefighters, police,
and hospital workers by prohibiting strikes, restricting the scope of
bargaining, and imposing compulsory arbitration. 24 This case provided
the reasons upon which the other two cases in the trilogy were
based. 25 The majority decision, which was written by Le Dain J., was
very short (under two pages) and provided both a conceptual and
22 I think there are good reasons for the Supreme Court of Canada to provide
constitutional protection to key elements of collective bargaining. I have
expressed these opinions in affidavits provided for Dunmore (sworn February 28,
1997 and September 23, 1997) and in support of litigation brought by the United
Food and Commercial Workers Union challenging the constitutionality of the
Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 16 [AEP Act], which was
introduced by the Ontario government in response to Dunmore (sworn February
25, 2004 and March 11, 2004).
23 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 11 at 32; Fudge, supra note 3 at 61-62.
24 Alberta Reference, supra note 4.
25 PSAC, supra note 4, involved federal legislation extending the life of collective
agreements by two years and thereby postponing the use of strikes and limiting
wage increases to 6% in the first year and 5% in the second year. In RWDSU, supra
note 4, the challenge involved back-to-work legislation to end a general lockout
and partial strike in the dairy industry and imposed compulsory arbitration.
The Supreme Court of Canada and the Freedom of Association 431
institutional analysis of why the freedom of association protected in
the Charter does not include collective bargaining. 2 6 According tc Le
Dain J., whose reasons were endorsed by two other judges, the freeciom
of association only encompassed the freedom to join in association
for a common purpose and association activities insofar as they
represented the exercise of another fundamental or constitutionally
protected right or freedom. 2 7 He rejected the argument that freedom
of association be extended to activities essential to an association's
existence or the underlying purposes of the association because of the
"implications of extending a constitutional guarantee.. .to the right to
engage in particular activity on the ground that the activity is
essential to give an association meaningful existence." 2 8 It appears
that Le Dain J. was concerned about providing constitutional protection
to too great a range of associational activity. According to him,
[t]he rights for which constitutional protection are
sought-the modern rights to bargain collectively and to
strike, involving correlative duties or obligations resting on
an employer-are not fundamental rights or freedoms.
They are the creation of legislation, involving a balance of
competing interests in a field which has been recognized
by the courts as requiring a specialized expertise. 29
However, why a right is not considered to be fundamental because it
is modern and legislative is not explained in the decision. This is an
important omission, for, as Dianne Pothier has pointed out, it took
the introduction of human rights legislation after World War II "for
Canadian law to accept that non-discrimination rights could trump
freedom of contract."' 30
Le Dain J. also ran the conceptual argument into the institutional
argument by claiming that modern legislative rights such as collective
bargaining require the balancing of competing interests and thus
courts should defer to legislatures in such cases. However, all sorts of
rights claims involve balancing competing interests and rights;
equality rights, for example, may conflict with religious freedoms
and courts have to balance these rights. 3 1 The majority begged the
26 For this terminology, see Dianne Pothier, "Twenty Years of Labour Law and the
Charter" (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 369 at 374.
27 Alberta Reference, supra note 4. Beetz and La Forest JJ. concurred with Le Dain J.
28 Ibid. at 390-91.
29 Ibid. at 391.
30 Pothier, supra note 26 at 374 [footnote omitted].
31 Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772,
199 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2001 SCC 31, posed the question of how to handle the conflict
between freedom of religion and equality claims in the context of human rights
legislation.
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question of why courts should not interfere with the balance that the
legislature has struck in collective bargaining but should interfere
with the legislative balance struck in other contexts. The problem
with Le Dain's J. analysis is that he fails to address what has been
distinctive about the courts' approach to trade union rights and
entitlements-that the individualism and pro-property bias of the
common law has been disadvantageous to unions and for this reason,
courts have been urged to defer to legislatures when it comes to
workers' collective rights. 3 2
In separate and concurring reasons, McIntyre J. limited freedom
of association to the protection of all activities pursued in association
with others that a person could lawfully pursue as an individual. 3 3
According to him, "[i]f Charter protection is given to an association
for its lawful acts and objects, then the Charter-protected rights of the
association would exceed those of the individual merely by virtue of
the fact of association." 34 He invoked the examples of gun and golf
clubs to demonstrate how unacceptable it would be to protect the
objects and activities of an association. 3 5 He went on to state that:
[m]odern labour relations legislation has so radically
altered the legal relationship between employees and
employers in unionized industries that no analogy may be
drawn between the lawful actions of individual employees
in ceasing to work and the lawful actions of union members
in engaging in a strike .... It is apparent, in my view, that
interpreting freedom of association to mean that every
individual is free to do with others that which he is lawfully
entitled to do alone would not entail guaranteeing the
right to strike. 3 6
He also agreed with Le Dain J. that courts should defer to legislatures
when it came to labour legislation since labour relations was a matter
of politics and economics. 3 7 However, McIntyre J. specifically stated
in PSAC that "[m]y finding in this case does not, however, preclude
the possibility that other aspects of collective bargaining may receive
Charter protection under the guarantee of freedom of association." 3 8
32 Fudge & Tucker, supra note 6 at c. 11; Brian Etherington, "An Assessment of
Judicial Review of Labour Laws under the Charter. Of Realists, Romantics, and
Pragmatists" (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 685.
33 Alberta Reference, supra note 4 at 407.
34 Ibid. at 404.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. at 411-12.
37 Ibid. at 414.38 Supra note 4 at 453.
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The problem with Mclntrye J.'s analysis is the simple analogy that
he draws, without discussion or elaboration, between gun and golf
clubs on the one hand, and trade unions on the other. The crucial
issue is not whether there is an individual analogue (such as an
individual employee's quitting) to a strike, 39 but whether it is
accurate to equate qualitatively different kinds of association for the
purpose of guaranteeing Charter rights. Instead of questioning whether
it is appropriate to analogize different types of associations, Peter
Hogg also focuses on the qualitative difference between collective
and individual action. He praises Paul Weiler's invocation of price-
fixing by businesses as a "good example" of the significance of the
distinction between individual and collective action: "[W] hat is lawful
for an individual seller is properly prohibited by our competition law
when performed in concert with other sellers. It is surely an undue
extension of freedom of association to expand its protection to every
activity by an association that is permitted to an individual."40
However, business price-fixing cartels are quite different from trade
unions. Historically, trade unions have played an important role in
the struggle for democracy and the achievement of human rights.
This claim is not true of businesses that combine to interfere with the
market.4 1 It is because trade unions are regarded as a vehicle for
protecting individuals who would otherwise be vulnerable to
exploitation that they, and the practice of collective bargaining, are
specifically excluded from competition legislation. 42 It is the objects
of the association and the history of how the law has treated the
association that are important in determining the scope of Charter-
protected rights and not whether there is an individual analogue for
collective action.
39 See David Beatty & Steven Kennett, "Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest
and Political Participation in Free and Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar
Rev. 573 at 589.
40 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough: Carswell, 2003) 41-48;
Paul C. Weiler, "The Charter at Work: Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of
Labour and Employment Law" (1990) 40 U.T.LJ. 117, 146-47.
41 Alan Fox, History and Heritage: The Social Origins of the British Industrial Relations
System (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Bryan D. Palmer, Working Class Experience:
Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991, 2nd ed. (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1992); Desmond Morton, Working People, 4th ed.
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998).
42 Both the common law and anti-combinations legislation have historically forbidden
entrepreneurs from combining to restrict competition, which is the guiding
principle of commercial law and policy. However, this principle does not apply in
the labour relations context because of the distinctive nature of labour-its
humanity. This understanding of the distinctive nature of labour is incorporated
into the current Canadian Competition Act that exempts "combinations or activities
of workmen or employees for their own reasonable protection" as well as
arrangements pertaining to collective bargaining over terms and conditions of
employment: Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 4(1)(a).
434 Saskatchewan Law Review 2004 Vol. 67
In his dissent in the Alberta Reference, Dickson C.J. emphasized
the distinctive nature of trade unions and labour rights and their
collective dimension. Unlike the other judges, he referred to the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and its jurisprudence on the
freedom of association as a source for the meaning of the Canadian
guarantee. 4 3 According to him, "[f]reedom of association is the
cornerstone of modern labour relations. Historically, workers have
combined to overcome the inherent inequalities of bargaining power
in the employment relationship and to protect themselves from
unfair, unsafe, or exploitative working conditions." 44 He went on to
state that "[i]f freedom of association only protects the joining
together of persons for common purposes, but not the pursuit of the
very activities for which the association was formed, then the freedom
is indeed legalistic, ungenerous, indeed vapid. ' '4 5 He concluded that
collective bargaining and striking were essential if unions were to be
able to attain their objects and thus were included under the freedom
of association protected in the Charter.4 6 Although Dickson CJ. made
it clear that not all associational activity attracts constitutional
protection merely because it is engaged in by more than one person,
"he never clearly articulated what it was about the objects of unions
that would determine what kinds of objects of other associations
would merit constitutional protection." 47
The issue of whether the Charter's guarantee of freedom of
association included the right to bargain collectively appeared to
have been decisively resolved in 1990 by the Supreme Court in
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC) v. Northwest
Territories (Commissioner).4 8 The PIPSC represented a group of federal
nurses whose employment was transferred to the government of the
Northwest Territories. The public service labour legislation in the
Northwest Territories required a union to be incorporated in order to
be certified as a bargaining representative for public service employees.
43 Alberta Reference, supra note 4 at 353. Wilson J. agreed with Dickson C.J.'s
characterization of the scope of the freedom of association in the Labour Trilogy,
although she departed from him over the s. 1 analysis.
44 Ibid. at 334.
45 Ibid. at 362-63.
46 Ibid. at 371. In his s. 1 analysis in each of the cases in the Labour Trilogy, Dickson
C.J. was very deferential to the governments in upholding the limitations on the
union's freedom of association. Wilson J. adopted a less deferential stance in both
PSAC and RWDSU.
47 Pothier, supra note 26 at 379 [footnote omitted].
48 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [PIPSC v. Northwest Territories cited to S.C.R.].
The Court split four to three, with five judges writing reasons. Sopinka J. wrote
substantive reasons dismissing the appeal while Dickson CJ., La Forest J. and
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. each wrote their own reasons, agreeing in the result with
Sopinka J.
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The government refused to incorporate the PIPSC and thus, it could
not bargain collectively on behalf of its transferred members. Four of
the seven judges, including Dickson J. who wrote that he was bound
by the majority decision in the Labour Trilogy,49 held that the freedom
of association did not protect the right to bargain collectively. The
majority of the judges concluded that the government was under no
constitutional obligation to provide a statutory scheme for collective
bargaining by recognition or certification. According to Sopinka J.,
"restrictions on the activity of collective bargaining do not normally
affect the ability of individuals to form or join unions."5 0 He limited
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association to that of
simply forming an association. In dissent, Cory J. complained that
limiting the protection of freedom of association to the simple act of
associating without protecting any of the objects of the association
was like allowing people to form and join hockey teams without
allowing them to play hockey.5 1
The problem with Cory J.'s analogy is that the nurses over which
PIPSC claimed representation rights did have a representative, the
Northwest Territories Public Service Association (NWTPSA), which
could collectively bargain on their behalf. What PIPSC wanted was to
carve out a separate bargaining unit for the nurses it had formerly
represented; it was not challenging the representativeness of the
NWTPSA. Instead of arguing for a specific bargaining unit as a
Charter-protected right (which would be a difficult argument to
make), PIPSC argued that the denial of a certification procedure
violated its constitutionally protected right. Although, as Pothier
remarked, "PIPS[C] was not a very good case for determining the issue
of whether there is a right to collective bargaining encompassed
within freedom of association," 52 it became the precedent for excluding
collective bargaining from constitutional protection in subsequent
cases.
In the 1999 case of Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General),5 3
the Supreme Court issued another narrow interpretation of freedom
of association in the labour relations context. A member of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), who was the president of an
informal employees' association representing RCMP officers in
Quebec, challenged the exclusion of RCMP members from the collective
bargaining legislation governing federal public service workers as a
violation of the freedom of association protected in the Charter. He
49 In his brief reasons Dickson C.J. stated that the appeal must fail "because of the
individual nature of the s. 2(d) right": ibid. at 373-74.
so Ibid. at 404.
51 Ibid. at 382. Cory J.'s dissent was supported by Wilson and Gonthier JJ.
52 Pothier, supra note 26 at 384.
53 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 513 [Delisle].
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argued that the exclusion of RCMP members from the statutory
protections regarding collective bargaining left them vulnerable to
management actions designed to influence their right to form an
association and carry out its lawful activities. Writing for the majority
(four of the seven judges), Bastarache J. held that only the establishment
of an independent employee association and the exercise in association
of the lawful rights of its members are protected under the freedom
of association in the Charter.5 4 He also stated that the protection of
fundamental freedoms would not generally impose a positive
obligation of protection or inclusion on the government. 55
Two years later Bastarache J. wrote the majority decision in Dunmore,
which appears to have significantly expanded the scope of union-related
activities protected by the Charter's guarantee of freedom of association.
Despite the fact that it is the freedom of association decision that has
most markedly departed from precedent, Dunmore saw the highest degree
of consensus among the judges in any freedom of association decision
in the labour context to date. Six signed the majority decision,
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurred, and only Major J. dissented.
In Ontario, agricultural workers were excluded from the basic
labour relations statute that protects union organizing activity and
collective bargaining until 1994 when the first provincial New
Democratic Party government enacted collective bargaining legislation
specifically designed for agricultural workers. 56 Ontario has the
largest agriculture industry in Canada and employs the greatest
number of agricultural workers. Almost half of these workers are
employed on farms with sales over a million dollars a year.5 7 The
United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) used this
legislation to organize a couple of hundred workers at several
mushroom and poultry operations. 58 When the Conservative
54 Ibid. at para. 28. Bastarache J. cited PIPSC v. Northwest Territories, supra note 48 at
405, 407-408 for the proposition that collective bargaining is not protected by the
Charter's guarantee of freedom of association. Gonthier J., McLachlin C.J. and
Major J. agreed with Bastarache J.
55 Delisle, supra note 53 at para. 33. In her concurring reasons L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
indicated that there might be a positive obligation to provide legislative protection
against unfair labour practices or some form of official recognition under labour
legislation because of the inherent vulnerability of employees to management: ibid.
56 Agricultural Labour Relations Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, c. 6. Notably, this legislation
provided final offer selection instead of strikes and lockouts as the form of resolving
negotiation disputes.
57 See expert affidavits of Fudge, supra note 22. See also James White, A Profile of
Ontario Farms and Farm Labour (Brampton, Ont.: James White & Associates, 1997).
58 Hughes, supra note 13 at 30, n. 13. During the operation of the Agricultural Labour
Relations Act, 1994, the UFCW was certified to represent workers at a mushroom
operation and had two certifications (one for another mushroom operation and
another for a poultry operation) pending.
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government of Mike Harris was elected in 1995, it immediately
repealed the statute that allowed agricultural workers to organize and
revoked the certifications that the food and commercial workers
union had secured in order to represent them. 59 The union brought
a Charter challenge, arguing that by repealing the agricultural labour
relations legislation and reinstating the exemption of agricultural
workers from the labour relations statute, the government was
violating agricultural workers' freedom of association. The union
argued there was a violation because employers would be able to
retaliate against agricultural workers who joined or participated in
trade unions. Eight of the nine members of the Court ruled that the
exclusion of agricultural workers from labour relations legislation
substantially interfered with their fundamental freedom to associate.
Although the majority considered protecting the family farm to be a
valid legislative objective, the total exclusion of all agricultural
workers, regardless of the type of farm they worked on, was not
justifiable. 60 The majority declared that the legislation that repealed
the agricultural collective bargaining legislation was invalid, but
suspended the effect of the declaration for eighteen months in order
to give the government time to enact a new law.
Although Bastarache J. took care to align the reasons in Dunmore
with the Supreme Court's earlier freedom of association decisions, the
case marks a major change in direction. He held that freedom of
association imposes a positive obligation on the government to
protect the rights of vulnerable workers (such as agricultural workers)
to join and participate in unions and to make collective representations
to their employer. According to Bastarache J., the government's failure
to include agricultural workers in a legislative scheme impaired their
ability to exercise their fundamental freedom.6 1 By contrast, Major J.
held that the mere exclusion from the statutory labour relations
regime did not in any way impair the agricultural workers' freedom
to organize at common law.62 Bastarache J. also made it clear that the
59 Section 80(1) of the Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act,
1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, repealed the Agricultural Labour Relations Act, 1994 and
excluded agricultural workers from the Labour Relations Act, 1995, enacted as
Schedule A to the Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, 1995.
60 Dunmore, supra note 14 at para. 62. Alberta is the only other jurisdiction in Canada
that excludes all agricultural workers from the general labour relations legislation.
61 Ibid. at paras. 21-23. It was on this basis that the Court distinguished Delisle, supra
note 53. In Delisle, the RCMP officers had established employee associations in the
absence of legislation.
62 Major J. essentially accepted the reasoning of Sharpe J. at trial: Dunmore v. Ontario
(Attorney General) (1997), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 37 O.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
According to this reasoning the state could not be held accountable for the inability
of agricultural workers to exercise their freedom of association as agricultural
workers historically experienced difficulty in organizing before the enactment of
labour legislation. For these judges (Major J. and Sharpe J.), it was private employers
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freedom of association protected in the Charter has a collective
dimension, referring to both Dickson CJ.'s dissent in the Alberta Reference
and the ILO's jurisprudence as support. 63 The key question is whether
the state has "precluded activity because of its associational nature,
thereby discouraging the collective pursuit of common goals."
64
According to Patricia Hughes, "[t]his approach means that objects of
that association, as opposed to the act of associating, are to be viewed
as a relevant consideration." 6 5
Yet, despite all of the strong language about the collective nature
of the freedom of association and the importance of work for individual
dignity, there are some real limitations in Dunmore. Although
Bastarache J. stated that freedom of association was not limited
exclusively to individuals and included collective activities, he also
reiterated that freedom of association does not include collective
bargaining and the right to strike.6 6 Moreover, he was also careful to
limit the extent of the positive obligation on governments. The
requirement that governments enact legislation protecting workers'
freedom of association seems to be dependent on a finding that the
workers are extremely vulnerable and that most other workers have
access to collective bargaining legislation. 6 7
The problem with assessing Dunmore is that it is fundamentally
ambiguous. Does it signal a new collective approach to the freedom
of association for working people or is it limited to extending protection
for vulnerable workers such as agricultural workers? In their recent
and not the state who were responsible for the inability of agricultural workers to
organize. According to B. Jamie Cameron, " [o]n the evidence, Sharpe J. at trial,
and Major J., at the Supreme Court of Canada, are surely correct that factors other
than the statutory exclusion explain the inability of these workers to organize":
B. Jamie Cameron, "The 'Second Labour Trilogy': A Comment on R. v. Advance
Cutting, Dunmore v. Ontario, and R.W.D.S.U. v. Pepsi-Cola" (2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L.
Review (2d) 67 at 86, n. 95. Hogg, supra note 40 at 34.2(b) also accepts this analysis.
However, there was undisputed evidence at trial demonstrating that without
legislative protection, agricultural employees are unable to unionize: Dunmore,
supra note 14 at paras. 39, 42, and 67. Moreover, other commentators have noted
that Bastarache J. makes it clear that the impact of the legislative exclusion
contributed significantly to the inability of agricultural workers to exercise their
associational rights: Barrett, supra note 16 at 113-14, n. 71; Rootham et al., supra
note 16 at 164.
63 Dunmore, supra note 14 at para. 16.
64 Ibid. [emphasis omitted].
65 Hughes, supra note 13 at 43-44.
66 Dunmore, supra note 14 at para. 17: "This is not to say that all such activities are
protected by s. 2(d), nor that all collectivities are worthy of constitutional protection;
indeed, this Court has repeatedly excluded the right to strike and collectively
bargain from the protected ambit of s. 2(d)."
67 Ibid. at paras. 43-48.
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article on Canada, the ILO, and the freedom of association, Brian
Burkett, John Craig, and Jodi Gallagher speculate that
in the post-Dunmore era, the jurisprudence on [freedom of
association] may develop along two distinct paths. Down
one path lies an expansion of Dunmore toward the broad
guarantees embodied in the Freedom of Association
Conventions. Along the second path lies a confirmation of
the principles set out in the Alberta Reference, in which the
Dunmore decision is viewed as a limited, principled
expansion of individual rights rather than a sweeping
recognition of collective, institutional union rights. 68
Only time will tell which path courts will take. The preliminary
results have been both equivocal and limited. The British Columbia
Supreme Court and the Alberta and Ontario Labour Relations Boards
have adopted a restrictive interpretation of Dunmore in the context of
challenges to hospital restructuring legislation and to legislative
requirements that unions forfeit dues during illegal strikes. 6 9
However, the labour boards in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick
have interpreted the case as elevating protections against unfair
labour practices to a constitutional status. 70
The crucial question is whether the Supreme Court of Canada can
continue to separate freedom of association from collective bargaining.
This separation is particularly difficult now that a majority of the
Court has invoked the ILO jurisprudence as a source for the interpretation
of Charter rights. Canada is bound by the ILO Convention No. 98 on the
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining,7 1 as much as it is by the
Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
to Organize,72 even though the Court has seen fit to mention only the
68 Burkett, Craig & Gallagher, supra note 16 at 268.
69 Health Services & Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia
(2003), 19 B.C.L.R. (4th) 37, 2003 BCSC 1379; Provincial Health Authorities of
Alberta (Re), [2002] Alta. L.R.B.R. 230, [2002] A.L.R.B.D. No. 72 (QL); Ontario
Hospital Association, [2003] O.L.R.D. No. 1545 (QL).
70 Cabtec Manufacturing Inc. (Re), [2002] S.L.R.B.D. No. 27 (QL); Regent Construction
Inc. (Re), [2002] N.B.L.E.B.D. No. 7 (QL).
71 Adopted by the International Labour Conference, 32nd Sess., 1 July 1949 (entered
into force 18 July 1951) [Convention No. 98]. Reprinted in Ian Brownlie & Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill, eds., Basic Documents on Human Rights, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002) at 326; online: <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
convdispl.htm> select: C98.
72 Adopted by the International Labour Conference, 31st Sess., 9 July 1948, in San
Francisco (entered into force 4 July 1950) [Convention No. 87]. Reprinted in ILO,
Conventions and Recommendations Adopted by the International Labour Conference
1919-1966 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1996) at 663, online:
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm> select: C87.
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latter in defining the scope of the Charter-protected freedom of
association. 73 This is because the freedom of association is a central
element of the ILO's Constitution. Both the Preamble and Part XIII of
the Treaty of Versailles74 recognize it. In 1944 the ILO adopted the
1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, which also affirmed the freedom of
association for workers as one of the principles upon which the
Organization was founded. This Declaration, which was incorporated
into the ILO's Constitution in 1946, also recognized the ILO's obligation
to further the implementation of programs which would achieve
"the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the
cooperation of management and labour in the continuous
improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of
workers and employers in the preparation and application of social
and economic measures." 75 Member states of the ILO are bound to
respect the principles contained in the ILO's Constitution. Freedom
of association and the right to bargain collectively are considered
fundamental principles and rights that member states are bound to
respect and protect. 76 Thus, it will be difficult for the Court to justify
picking and choosing between Canada's ILO obligations (for example,
the right to form and join trade unions but not the right to bargain
collectively) when interpreting the reach of Charter-protected labour
rights.
Even now the exclusion of agricultural workers from the Labour
Relations Act 77 is being challenged before the Ontario Labour Relations
Board, and the union that has been organizing agricultural workers in
Ontario launched a Charter challenge to the legislation that the
Conservative government introduced in response to Dunmore. The
government took a minimalist approach to the Supreme Court's
decision, and the legislation prohibits employers from taking action
against agricultural employees simply for joining or participating in
an employees' association and requires the employer to listen to the
73 Dunmore, supra note at 14 at para. 27. Canada has ratified Convention No. 87 (in
1972), but has not ratified Convention No. 98. The federal government refuses to
ratify conventions in situations where provincial legislation is in breach of the
conventions: see Ken Norman, "ILO Freedom of Association Principles as Basic
Canadian Human Rights: Promises to Keep" (2004) 67 Sask. L. Rev. 591 at 596.
74 The Treaty of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 June 1919
(signed at Versailles) [Treaty of Versailles].
75 Supra note 1 at Annex 111(e).
76 Tonia Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike: A
Comparative Study of Standards Set by the International Labour Organization, the
Council of Europe and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)
at c. 5; George Tsogas, Labor Regulation in a Global Economy (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.
Sharpe, 2001) at c. 2.
77 S.O. 1995, c. 1.
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agricultural workers' representative. 78 However, it does not impose a
duty on the employer to bargain with the workers' representative or
a requirement that the representative be selected by a majority of the
affected employees. In effect, the legislation is worthless-it does not
promote collective bargaining nor does it recognize trade unions. 79
78 The AEP Act, supra note 22 imposes a number of limited restrictions and obligations
on employers. It prohibits employers from interfering, coercing, or discriminating
against agricultural employees simply because they have formed, joined, or
participated in the lawful activities of an employees' association (s. 9, 10). In the
event of an employee complaint, the burden is on the employer to establish that
he or she did not discriminate against the employee because the employee was
involved in, or a member of, an employees' association. The AEP Act also requires
the employer to give an "employees' association a reasonable opportunity to
make representations respecting the terms and conditions of employment of one
or more of its members who are employed by that employer" and listen to oral
representations or give a written acknowledgment that the employer has read the
representations (s. 5). In determining whether "a reasonable opportunity to make
representations" has been given, the following considerations are relevant:
1. The timing of the representation relative to planting and harvesting
times.
2. The timing of the representations relative to concerns that may arise
in running an agricultural operation, including, but not limited to,
weather, animal health and safety and plant health.
3. The frequency and repetitiveness of the representations (s. 5).
The freedom of assembly protected under the legislation is also very narrow. The
AEP Act provides a mechanism for "any person or entity" to apply to a tribunal to
obtain access to the employers' property in situations where the agricultural
employees reside on the employers' premises in order to persuade the employees
to join an employees' association (s. 7(2)). The person or entity seeking access has
the burden of satisfying the tribunal that an order giving access to the employer's
property is necessary "to effectively communicate with employees" (s. 7(6)). The
tribunal is also required to "ensure that the access does not unduly interfere with,"
among other things, "normal agricultural practices" and "privacy or property
rights" (s. 7(7)). Essentially, the AEP Act provides very limited unfair labour practice
protections for employees to join and participate in employees' associations and
imposes a narrow duty on employers to provide access to employees who reside
on employer property and endure representations made by employees' associations.
79 The AEP Act does nothing to support trade unions as employee representatives. In
fact, it creates a framework that will likely undermine trade unions by permitting
multiple representatives and not requiring majority support as a principle of
representation. All the AEP Act does is stipulate that an employees' association be
arms' length from the employer (s. 8). However, it does nothing to ensure either
that the employees' association is independent of the employer's influence or
freely chosen by the employees. Unlike the Labour Relations Act, supra note 77, the
AEP Act does not require that employees' associations to be democratically selected
or that they represent a majority of the employees. The AEP Act allows for the
possibility that several employees' associations could represent the agricultural
employees of one employer. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food's Fact Sheet on
the AEP Act states that the Act "does not give any right of exclusive representation
to employees' associations. Employees from the same workplace can choose to
form or join different employees' associations": Ontario, Ministry of Agriculture
and Food, Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002 (Factsheet) (June 2003) at
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Several supervisory bodies of the ILO have repeatedly found that
the exclusion of agricultural workers from legislation that promotes
collective bargaining violates these workers' fundamental freedom to
associate and right to bargain collectively.80 In 1996 a complaint by
the Canadian Labour Congress that alleged that the legislation in
Ontario that excluded agricultural workers from the Labour Relations
Act without providing them with a mechanism to exercise their rights
to organize and bargain collectively violated ILO standards and
principles concerning freedom of association and collective bargaining
was referred to the Committee on Freedom of Association. The
Committee considered the complaint in 1997 and concluded
that the absence of any statutory machinery for the promotion
of collective bargaining and the lack of specific protective
measures against anti-union discrimination and employer
interference in trade union activities constitutes an
impediment to one of the principle objectives of the
guarantee of freedom of association, that is the forming of
s. 6, online: <http://www.gov.on.ca/OMAFRA/english/busdev/facts/03-045.htm>.
Under the AEP Act a union that represents 90% of the agricultural employees at a
specific workplace would have the same right to represent the employees as an
employee who represented two other co-workers or a group that represented 5%
of the employees.
80 All ratified conventions are dealt with by the ILO's Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR). The CEACR was
established in 1926 and it is composed of twenty independent experts who meet
annually to review the reports sent by governments. It is the legal body responsible
for examining the compliance of ILO member states with conventions. The
CEACR comments on problems encountered by countries in the application of
ratified conventions and submits its report to the annual International Labour
Conference. In more difficult cases, the situation is referred to the tripartite
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards in the annual session of
the International Labour Conference. The chief task of the Conference Committee
on the Application of Standards is to discuss with a representative of the government
concerned the main problem the CEACR encountered in that government's
application of standards. Even if a member state has not ratified a specific freedom
of association convention, it is possible to invoke the constitutional complaint
procedure against that state since freedom of association is recognized in the ILO
Constitution. In 1951, the Governing Body created a special committee called the
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) which is a tripartite body comprised
of nine members of the Governing Body, and since 1978, it has been chaired by
an independent. The CFA meets three times a year in order to examine complaints
alleging violations of the Conventions on Freedom of Association. The CFA
examines the substance of cases submitted to it and presents its conclusions to the
Governing Body, which is the executive council of the ILO. The Governing Body
has fifty-six members (twenty-eight government and fourteen each employer and
worker representatives).
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independent organizations capable of concluding collective
agreements. 8 1
The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada take
the necessary measures to ensure that agricultural workers have
access to "machinery and procedures which facilitate collective
bargaining" 82 and "effective protection from anti-union discrimination
and employer interference." 83 It also drew the attention of the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Recommendations and
Conventions (CEACR) to the legislative aspects of the case.84
81 ILO, Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 308, G.B. 270/7, November
1997 at para. 187, online: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/
docs/gb270/gb-7.htm> [CFA Report 308]. Bastarache J. referred to the Committee's
decision; however, he only discussed freedom of association in terms of the right
to join a trade union and ignored the aspect of the decision that dealt with collective
bargaining: Dunmore, supra note 14 at para. 41.
82 CFA Report 308, supra note 81 at 194.
83 Ibid.
84 In its report to the 1999 session of the International Labour Conference, the
CEACR noted that agricultural workers were excluded from the Labour Relations
Act in Ontario and the CFA's conclusions regarding the exclusion. The CEACR
urged the government of Canada "to take the necessary measures to amend the
aforementioned legislation in order to bring it into full conformity with the
principles of freedom of association": Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (Part 1A), ILC, 87th
Sess., 1999, online: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/
r-iiila.htm>. It also referred the exclusion of agricultural workers to the
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, where the Canadian
government's representative was called on to account for the exclusion of
agricultural workers from labour relations legislation in front of the Committee
on the Application of Standards at the 1999 session of the International Labour
Conference. The International Labour Conference, which meets annually in
Geneva, is the legislative branch of the ILO, and it functions as an international
parliament of labour. The Conference has a tripartite membership structure-each
member State has two government delegates and one delegate representing
employers and another representing workers-which is designed to enhance the
legitimacy and viability of the rights and standards that it adopts. The Committee
concluded its two hour session by stressing that the guarantees provided under
Convention No. 87 "applied to all workers without distinction whatsoever, and that
all workers should enjoy the right to establish and join organizations of their own
choosing to further and defend their occupational interests": Report of the
Committee on the Application of Standards, ILC, 87th Session, 1999, Canada. Again
in 2001 the CEACR observed that Ontario continued to exclude agricultural workers
from its labour relations legislation. While noting the Ontario government's
information that agricultural workers were entitled to form associations and
participate in voluntary negotiations, the CEACR urged the government to
amend the legislation to bring it into full conformity with Convention No. 87. It
also asked the Canadian government to keep it informed of the Supreme Court of
Canada's impending decision regarding the exclusion of agricultural workers:
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, supra.
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In March 2003 the Committee on Freedom of Association again
examined the exclusion of agricultural workers from labour relations
legislation in Ontario and noted that since its initial consideration of
the case in 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada had issued its decision
regarding the Ontario exclusion and the Ontario government had
enacted the Agricultural Employees Protection Act in response to the
decision. However, the Committee went on to note "that this legislation
does not give agricultural workers the right to establish or join trade
unions and to bargain collectively." 8 5 This observation was echoed
by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations in its report to the 2003 session of the
International Labour Conference. 86
Thus, both of the ILO's main supervisory bodies, the Committee
on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions, have stated that the Ontario agricultural
employees' legislation falls short of Canada's international obligations
and is in breach of international norms because it fails to provide
effective collective bargaining and recognition of trade unions. The
question is whether this legislation meets Canadian constitutional
standards: does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protect
collective bargaining? Given my incorrect prediction in 1987,87 1 will
not hazard any more predictions of what the Supreme Court will do.
However, I will mention a few considerations that are relevant to any
assessment of where the Supreme Court of Canada's freedom of
association jurisprudence may go.
The same year that the Court issued Dunmore, it also released R. v.
Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.,8 8 in which for the first time the
Supreme Court of Canada considered whether collective bargaining
legislation that required mandatory union membership violated
the freedom of association protected in the Charter. A divided court
narrowly (five to four) upheld the Quebec government's construction
industry collective bargaining legislation that required contractors to
hire only construction workers who are members of one of five union
groups listed in the statute.8 9 The legislation barely survived the s. 1
85 ILO, Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 330, GB 286/11, March
2003 at para. 27, online: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/
docs/gb286/pdf/gb-11-pl.pdf>.
86 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,
Report III (Part IA), ILC, 91st Sess., 2003.
87 Supra note 3.
88 [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 2001 SCC 70 [Advance Cutting & Coring].
89 A nine-member Court participated in the appeal. Four judges found no breach of the
Charter. Le Bel J., with Gonthier and Arbour JJ., stated that freedom of association
only protects individuals from forced ideological conformity and that compulsory
union membership does not amount to forced ideological conformity. L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. stated that freedom of association does not include the freedom not to
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analysis on the ground that the legislation stabilized what had been
violent labour relations within the construction industry. 90
Significantly, eight members of the Court interpreted the freedom of
association as including the right not to associate and a slight majority
considered that mandatory union membership violated that right.
Bastarache J., who held that compulsory union membership itself
amounted to forced ideological conformity, drew support, as he had
done in Dunmore, from international human rights law.9 1
The Supreme Court of Canada's decisions interpreting the freedom
of association in the labour relations context indicate that while the
Court considers some forms of workers' representation to be legitimate,
it is not clear what these forms are. Nor is it clear the range of collective
activities that are protected by the Charter. So far the Supreme Court
of Canada has not yet embraced the central tenet of industrial
pluralism-collective bargaining by democratically selected trade
unions-as a fundamental right protected by the Charter. Nor has it
fully embraced international human and labour rights jurisprudence
as the basis for interpreting freedom of association in the labour
context, although there are indications that it is an increasingly
important legal source. 9 2 However, as Advance Cutting & Coring
indicates, international labour and human law rights can cut both
for and against unions, although generally it tends to favour them.
Moreover, according to Michael MacNeil, "Advance Cutting & Coring
provides a stark reminder of the complexity of applying constitutional
analysis in balancing competing visions of how a labour law regime
should be constructed." 9 3
Since the Supreme Court of Canada develops its jurisprudence on
a case by case basis, it has a great deal of discretion and flexibility in
responding to the facts of particular cases, broader shifts in public
and elite opinion, and international law. However, there are constraints
on how the Court can exercise its discretion. Some of the constraints
are immediate: the Court cannot completely control the cases that
associate. Five judges found a violation of the Charter, although one of them
(lacobucci J.) held that the legislation was saved under s. 1. Bastarache J., together
with McLachlin CJ., Major and Binnie JJ., held that compulsory trade union
membership is a form of forced ideological conformity that violates the Charter.
lacobucci J. rejected the narrow test of forced ideological conformity and held that
the freedom of association was violated by forced union membership.
90 Advance Cutting & Coring, supra note 88 at para. 117.
91 He referred to art. 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(111),
3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8.1:
Advance Cutting & Coring, supra note 88 at para. 11.
92 Norman, supra note 73.
93 "Unions and the Charter: The Supreme Court of Canada and Democratic Values"
(2002) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 3 at 23.
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come before it, and some cases (such as the vulnerable agricultural
workers in Dunmore who were denied basic statutory protection of
their collective rights) are more compelling than others (such as the
nurses in PIPSC v. the Northwest Territories who had a bargaining
representative-albeit one they did not choose-which could bargain
collectively on their behalf). Other constraints are longer term and
have more to do with the Court's institutional legitimacy. In the next
section I shall identify what I ignored when I offered my 1987
prediction-how the role that courts play within liberal democracies
might be influenced by broader changes in the political economy.
III. THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LABOUR RIGHTS
AS HUMAN RIGHTS
Resolving the commodity status of labour is an essential dilemma of
every liberal democracy.9 4 In the private realm of the market, workers
are bearers of a commodity-labour-whose price is determined by
supply and demand in the market for labour. As a private matter, the
employment relationship and wage bargain are of no concern to
anyone other than the individual buyer and seller. However, labour is
a "fictitious" commodity: neither is it produced as a commodity, nor
is its production governed by an assessment of its realization on the
market.9 5 Labour is embodied in human beings who are born, cared
for, and tended in a network of relations that operate outside of the
direct discipline of the market. Also, unlike other commodities,
human beings have the capacity to act individually and collectively
to resist the compulsion of supply and demand.
One of the principal responses of workers to their subordination
to employers in the labour market has been mutuality. Workers have
joined together not just to advance their economic interests, but to
build and enrich their lives and the lives of their families and
communities through horizontal networks and organizations that
provide social support and cultural expression. One important
expression and manifestation of mutuality is the trade union and
workers' collective action.
Collective worker action in liberal democracies is irretrievably
enmeshed with law and the state. When workers engage directly with
their employers to advance their interests, they do so within a political
and legal order. The democratic state offers an opportunity for workers
to express their humanity and demand that they not be treated simply
as commodities. Grounding its authority to govern in the idea of
94 The next paragraphs are based on Fudge & Tucker, supra note 6 at c. 1.
9S See generally Karl Polyani, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Hill Press,
1957); Antonella Picchio, Social Reproduction: The Political Economy of the Labour
Market (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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consent and avowing its commitment to liberty, equality and the rule
of law, the liberal state is impelled, however grudgingly, to respond to
the demands of its propertyless subjects. Workers sought to use the
political logic of the liberal state to inhibit their commodification in
the capitalist economy by pressing their democratic demands as
citizens for inhibitions in the private realm of market relations.
However, in doing so they also had to confront and contest the
boundary between the realm of commodities where individualism,
contract and property rule, and the realm of citizenship where
associational democracy governs. 9 6
The turn to the liberal state, however, is not without its dangers
for workers. The slow emergence of the liberal state signalled not only
the dominance of political democracy, but the hegemony of private
property as the means of organizing economic activity.9 7 The liberal
state is the guarantor of individual property rights and provides
owners with a system of law in which their claims are both vindicated
and enforced. In Anglo-American legal systems the common law and
the ordinary courts have emphasized individualism, contract, and
property. Market power can translate into political and legal influence
not only through instrumental ties, but through deep structural
linkages and the pervasive ideological expression of the view that the
interests of capital are coincident with the those of the polity as a
whole. The liberal state must mediate the political demands of
workers and employers, but it can never completely resolve the
contradiction between democracy and private property.9 8
A recurring impetus and challenge for the liberal state is to
institutionalize and contain the conflict within the labour market. In
1919, when the ILO was established after the devastation and
destruction of the Great War, it became generally accepted that one
of the important roles of government is to mediate competition in
the labour market and the conflict that results by respecting certain
labour rights as fundamental. 9 9 Towards the end of World War II the
constitutional objectives of the ILO were reviewed in light of the
atrocity of "[c]oncentration camps, in which not only genocide but
96 See generally Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism: Property,
Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought (New York: Basic Books,
1986); Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical
Materialism (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
97 See generally Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liberal Ideals and Marxist
Critique (London: Pluto Press, 1984).
98 See generally Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (Oxford:
Martin Robertson, 1982); David Montgomery, Citizen Worker: The Experience of
Workers in the United States with Democracy and the Free Market during the Nineteenth
Century (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
99 Canada was a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles.
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also forced labour was rife .... In this context, workers' rights came to
be viewed as human rights; they stemmed from a recognition of
human dignity."10 0 After World War II, the principle that labour is
not a commodity, which was part of the 1944 Declaration of
Philadelphia, became part of the ILO's constitution and countries like
Canada recognized freedom of association and collective bargaining
as fundamental rights. 10 1
During this period, governments across Canada enacted collective
bargaining legislation for workers first in the private sector and then
in the public sector. This legislation institutionalized the central
features of industrial pluralism and citizenship-the right of workers
to be represented by independent and democratic trade unions, and
mechanisms to assist in establishing collective bargaining. Steeped as
they were in the doctrines and individualism of the common law,
courts were initially suspicious of this legislation. From the 1940s to
the end of the 1970s, the legislature and not the courts, ensured that
labour was not treated simply or solely as a commodity.102
This political and institutional entente began to unravel in the
1980s. Legislatures began to roll back the institutions of industrial
pluralism first in the name of fiscal responsibility and then in the
name of ideological purity. When the Supreme Court of Canada
released the Labour Trilogy in 1987, Canada was on the cusp of
embracing neo-liberalism. The US-Canada Free Trade deal was a fait
accompli and the North American deal was in the offing. Public sector
workers were targeted for restraint throughout the 1990s, and faced
with unsympathetic legislatures and courts, unions turned to the ILO
to lodge complaints over violations of freedom of association. 10 3
Since the 1980s, Canada has had the dubious achievement of having
the highest number of successful complaints brought against it for
violating workers' right to freedom of association and collective
bargaining of any of the one hundred and seventy-five member
states of the ILO, and there is no sign that the tide is turning. 10 4 In
fact, a spate of recent complaints against the British Columbia
government's draconian repeal of collective bargaining and union
representation rights in the hospital sector have been successful. 10 5
However, governments across Canada continue simply to ignore their
100 Novitz, supra note 76 at 99.
101 Ibid. at c. 5.
102 Fudge & Tucker, supra note 6 at c. 10 and 11.
103 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 11; Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, "Pluralism or
Fragmentation?: The Twentieth-Century Employment Law Regime in Canada"
(2000) 46 Labour/Le Travail 251; Burkett, Craig & Gallagher, supra note 16.
104 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 11 at 208; Burkett, Craig & Gallagher, supra note 16
at 251-52.
105 Norman, supra note 73 at 605.
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ILO obligations. 106 The legislative assault against trade unions in the
public sector and the incremental erosion of collective bargaining
rights in the private sector both coincided with, and was conducive
to, a reinvigoration of market forces. The forces of globalization
accelerated the restructuring of the economy, unionization rates
began a slow decline, earnings inequality increased, and working
conditions deteriorated. 10 7
Canada's embrace of neo-liberalism at the national level is part of the
larger process of globalization and the worldwide shift in economic
and political power.10 8 A key component of the process of globalization
has been what Stephen Gill calls the "new constitutionalism," which
comprises the international economic agreements and institutions
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement' 09 and the World Trade
Organization. 110 These agreements and institutions put in place quasi-
legal processes whereby nation states cede their authority to interfere
with the market. According to Gill, "[i]n effect, new constitutionalism
confers privileged rights of citizenship and representation to corporate
capital, whilst constraining the democratization process that has
involved struggles for representation for hundreds of years." 1 11
One of the most salient features of globalization and new
constitutionalism during the 1990s was a profound and unprecedented
increase in social inequality and an intensification of the exploitation
of people on a worldwide scale. 112 Neo-liberal policies internationally
and domestically have subjected the majority of populations to
market forces. The proliferation of supranational agreements and
neo-liberal policies has led to pressure to recognize labour rights. The
gulf between social justice, on the one hand, and international trade
agreements and international economic institutions, on the other,
has increasingly become a cause for concern as it is perceived to be a
source of social and political instability. However, the attempt to link
a social clause to trade agreements has met with huge opposition
106 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 11 at 208; Norman, supra note 73 at 605-606.
107 Panitch & Swartz, supra note 11 at app. 1; Garnett Picot & Andrew Heisz, The
Performance of the 1990s Canadian Labour Market, Analytic Studies Branch
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Studies Branch Research Paper Series, No. 184 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2002).
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from the governments of developing countries who regard the tying
of trade to labour standards as a form of protectionism by developed
countries. 113
In this context the ILO has become "a social mediator in the
process of globalization." 11 4 At the United Nations' World Summit
for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995 and the World Trade
Organization Conference in Singapore in December 1996, world
leaders reaffirmed the important role of the ILO with regard to basic
workers rights. 1 15 In 1998 the International Labour Conference
issued the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 1 16
Although the 1998 Declaration does not have constitutional status,
it indicates how the ILO's constitution is to be interpreted. Members
states have an obligation to respect, promote, and realize these rights
in good faith. Moreover, like the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, the
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work recognizes
that social justice and economic progress are inextricably linked. 11 7 The
Declaration identifies four categories of fundamental rights at work:
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
effective collective bargaining; elimination of forced and compulsory
labour; effective prohibition of child labour; and elimination of
discrimination in employment and occupation. However, at the
same time as the ILO has limited what it counts as core labour
standards, it has also elevated them to the status of human or
fundamental rights. This characterization emphasizes the universal
nature of the standards selected as core rights and liberates them from
analysis solely in economic terms. 118 These rights are grounded in
respect for human dignity and can no longer be trumped by economic
efficiency. The rights in the Declaration "go to the essence of human
dignity at work, touching upon bedrock values of freedom and
equality." 1 19
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Canada played a crucial role in the development and adoption of
the Declaration. Canadian Ambassador Mark Moher, who was a
government delegate from Canada at the 1998 International Labour
Conference, was the Chairperson and Reporter of the Committee on
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
Canada's Minister of Labour, the Honourable Lawrence McAulay,
attended the 1998 International Labour Conference and made an
address to the Plenary indicating Canada's support for the
Declaration. Moreover, according to the Honourable Claudette
Bradshaw, the federal Minister of Labour, "Canada attaches great
importance to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work.. .the Declaration is the key instrument for the promotion of
the fundamental principles of freedom of association and collective
bargaining." 120 However, the problem is that there is no effective
means to ensure that member states protect these fundamental
rights. 12 1 Canada continues to fail to live up to its obligation to
respect the fundamental rights of freedom of association and collective
bargaining.1 22
It is important to place the recent shift in the Supreme Court's
Charter and labour jurisprudence in the broader context of neo-
liberalism and the growing resistance to it. Neo-liberalism has
wrenched the economy from the social, and old mechanisms of
redistribution have broken down. However, the detachment of the
market from society, which is neo-liberalism's goal, is hard to sustain
since inequality and insecurity tend to undermine civility and
authority. 12 3
The anti-globalization protests since 1999 in Seattle have revealed
the crisis of legitimacy at the international level where there has been
an attempt to rearrange the institutions of global governance and
enhance the role and authority of the specialized United Nations
agencies such as the ILO. Thus, at the same time as collective labour
rights have lost political legitimacy with Canadian governments,
increasingly collective labour rights have been conceptualized
internationally as fundamental human rights. The extent to which
120 Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, "Promoting the Declaration
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en/lp/spila/ila/04promoting.shtml>. See also Allan J. Torobin, "The Labour
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Ahead" (2000) 3:4 Workplace Gazette 85 at 90.
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123 Gill, supra note 108 at 139-40; Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, "Conclusion:
Privatization, Polarization, and Policy: Feminism and the Future," in Brenda
Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 403.
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the Supreme Court of Canada is prepared to recognize that labour is
not a commodity in this context is an open question.
IV. CONCLUSION
Historically, a fundamental tension in liberal societies has been
balancing property and contract, or the market, on the one hand,
with democracy and equality on the other. Nowhere is this tension
more evident than in the labour market. One of the major achievements
of the period after World War II was the institutionalization of a set
of rights and standards that guaranteed that labour was not simply
treated as a commodity. If the Supreme Court of Canada does not
recognize collective bargaining as a fundamental right, we may be
witnessing a major transformation in liberalism in which liberty no
longer has to be leavened with equality and liberalism no longer
includes citizenship at work.
However, even if the Supreme Court is prepared to recognize
collective bargaining as a fundamental right protected by the Charter,
the shift in the site of legitimation for labour rights from the legislature
to the courts does not bode well for unions or for working people.
Courts have the power neither to foster new institutions nor to
influence economic conditions. It is crucial in the face of neo-liberalism,
with its faith in the market as the sole means of allocation and
distribution, to continue to insist that labour is not a commodity,
but it is a sad commentary on democratic politics that the courts may
be one of the few places where this claim still has some legitimacy.
